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The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the impact of city policy changes and the processes of 
gentrification on 1980s nightlife subculture in New York City. What are important to this work 
are the contributions and influence of nightlife subculture to greater New York City history 
through fashion, music, and art. I intend to prove that, in combination with the city’s gradual 
revanchism of neighborhood properties, the self-destructive nature of this after-hours sector has 
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To me, for the past 100 years New York has represented a place for a misfit or a bohemian. You 
could come here and live. But downtown ended when the rents shot up. It is dead. It was finished 
10 years ago – Howard Goldkrand, Founder of Soundlab.1  
 
 Underwear, lunchboxes, heavy make up, and wigs mark the grave of New York City’s 
ostentatious 1980s club culture. While the local nightlife is still the most vibrant in the nation, it 
is a shadow of its former drug-addled, costumed club-goer self. In the cusp of the 1980s, at the 
time of its white flight and when fear of crime was already an integrated component of living in 
Gotham, New York City’s urban decay produced a hard and fast counter culture that attracted 
filmmakers, artists, and DJs to its mecca of self-expression. Nightclubs at this time clustered in 
the heart of Manhattan, patronized by a community of bohemian eccentrics. However, the 
celebrated hedonism found at such venues as Palladium, the Limelight, and Danceteria was 
fleeting. Over time, the scandal, gentrification, and politicization of the nightlife circuit altered 
New York’s reputation as the premier party capital. Why is the quality of nightlife no longer 
what it used to be? Why did this occur in the advent of positive economic change?  
 My research intends to prove the trajectory of authenticity within the nightlife culture, 
throughout its approximate decade-long existence from 1980 to mid-1990, is negatively 
correlated with New York City’s economic improvement. The authenticity I refer to describes 
the unique milieu that existed, specifically in Lower Manhattan, where a wide variety of multi-
disciplinary creatives  (namely within arts, music, and fashion) lived, worked, collaborated, and 
sought entertainment. These fringe communities are distinguished by a confluence of 
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2 Terry N Clark, The City as an Entertainment Machine, (revised edition, Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 2011) 
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independent art galleries, coffee shops, restaurants, and clubs. However, the problem with the 
authenticity or “the edge” I intend to explore is that both have gradually become popular urban 
tropes without the same signification. The City As An Entertainment Machine by Terry Clark 
considers this trope as he suggests that cities such as New York with a “gritty industrial past” 
and rich with long-established cultural production and consumption have the ideal properties for 
successful redevelopment. The nightlife in this era demonstrates the inception of such an 
aesthetic-driven consumerism. Such entertainment venues, closely interwoven with art and music 
and often frequented by urban tastemakers, fall under New York City’s increase of cultural 
offerings. As a result, Clark explains, “The intervention of large numbers of artists in space 
evincing depopulation and postindustrial decay often precedes and provides a condition for 
increased capital investment and more advanced gentrification.” 2  
Richard Florida, author of Cities and the Creative Class, explains his “creative capital 
theory,” whereupon creative people are the champions of regional economic growth and 
innovation. Creative human capital is split between the “super creative” core and “creative 
professionals.” The former and fundamental group consists of members such as university 
professors, poets, novelists, artists, entertainers, actors, designers and architects. Whether this 
entails designing a new product or composing a sheet of music, these core members that he 
describes “produce new forms or designs that are readily transferable and broadly useful.” 3 The 
latter group is highly trained, highly educated professionals who work in technology, financial 
services, law, health, or corporate business. These are often the innovators that generate solutions 
to complex problems, are often challenged to continually develop new ideas within their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Terry N Clark, The City as an Entertainment Machine, (revised edition, Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 2011) 
Print, 12.  
3 Richard L Florida, Cities and the Creative Class, (New York: Routledge, 2005) Print, 8.  
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respective fields, and hold greater economic clout than the former. Florida claims the cities 
within which the two parties reside are the most economically successful. High concentration of 
creative people translates to an equal number of forward-thinking innovations and subsequent 
positive economic outcomes. Thus, these cities display “strong signs of overall regional vitality, 
such as increases in regional employment and population.” 4 Florida’s well-known theory may 
have some validity, neglects to consider the cultural dynamics between the two schools that form 
his broad, 38 million strong “Creative Class”. The “super creative” core may eventually 
effectively coexist with “creative professionals”—which include young professionals or 
Yuppies—but the initial relationship is hostile and resistant, as evident in 1980s New York City. 
Framing Florida’s theory within Clark’s argument, the “super creative,” who align with the 
authenticity I previously described, exist first. They, in turn, attract corporate professionals that 
are drawn to the same aestheticized lifestyles as their bohemian counterparts, but are neither in 
the same creative class nor contribute to the same cultural conversations. Clark points out, “The 
standard ideological assault on Yuppies takes them to task for callously destroying the 
community fabric of once vibrant poor and working class neighborhoods, leading to wanton 
cultural and economic displacement.” 5 To clarify, “Yuppies” encroach on the spaces of lower-
income locality, but these intrusions exist both physically and ideologically. Tight-knit 
communities face gradual dispersal of longstanding cultural establishments through higher cost 
of living associated with gentrification. Poor neighborhoods also stand as a moral antithesis to 
the representation of affluence and consumption embodied by “creative professionals.” A case 
study of 1980s downtown nightlife underscores these ideological differences, as a resistance to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ibid., 8. 
5 Terry N Clark, The City as an Entertainment Machine, (revised edition Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 2011) 
Print, 9. 
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commerciality motivated and connected many cultural workers. In broader terms, 
professionals frequented and consumed the aesthetic productions of “super creative” 
tastemakers, yet fail to support, contribute, or sustain it.  
 Simply being “creative”, an umbrella descriptor Florida uses, neglects to observe the 
social intricacies between two distinct factions and also insufficiently considers the disruption 
one causes to the other. “The division between bohemia and the bourgeoisie (the “artist” and the 
“Yuppie”) 6 is belied by the extent to which Yuppies turn to aesthetic practices of artist for their 
cultural cues.” 7 The “super creative” core may share the same progressive ideals as creative 
professionals, but they associate with completely separate dichotomies. The exploration of this 
contentious relationship is where the authenticity of Manhattan nightlife, or rather the 
disintegration thereof, is explicated.  
 The decline of New York City nightlife can be attributed to more than the advanced 
gentrification it appears to have caused itself. As detailed in this paper, inexpensive or derelict 
spaces give rise to Gotham’s creative culture via direct affordability and artistic mentality. The 
construction of clubs and related nightlife businesses laid the foundations for areas where 
similarly creative-minded, low-income individuals settled. The gentrification and ascension of 
capital that followed cannot be directly attributed to the mere movement of these people, but 
rather the popularity of these establishments, their players, and the transformations of specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Also known as the “super-creative” core and the “creative professional,” in the language of Richard 
Florida. Note, specific artists in 1980s New York. 
7 Terry N Clark, The City as an Entertainment Machine, (rev. ed. Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 2011) Print, 
12. 
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neighborhoods areas that contained them. We find evidence of this through the swell of 
property prices, nightclub closures, and upscale real estate development throughout lower 
Manhattan.8  
Simultaneous to this demographic metamorphosis, government officials also sought to 
advertise New York as a livable environment and tourist destination through implementation of 
strict policy changes, of which pertained to the environment, patronage, or functionality of 
nightclubs and led to the gentrification of the institutions themselves. The combination of such 
initiatives became precursor to competitive citywide capital development and the steady 
displacement of those workers responsible for contributing to New York’s cultural enterprises. 
Nightclub culture unwittingly fed into capital and benefitted little in return. 9 Further tribulations, 
from the AIDS epidemic, drug abuse, to sensationalized media coverage, concluded the 
freewheeling era of this after hours sector.  
To the question “Is Downtown Dead?” or rather, what diminished the vibrancy and 
interconnectivity of artistic innovation and collaboration within lower Manhattan, Edward 
Lewine of the New York Times considers the extremities that both propelled Clubland into the 
limelight and ultimately drove it into extinction. He writes, “The decade that seems to define 
downtown for most of us today is the go-go 80’s when everything heated up. Wall Street money 
poured in. Loft prices soared. Starving artists suddenly achieved rock-star status. Drugs were 
plentiful and strong. Clubs like Area and Palladium became the places to watch bohemia, money, 
and the underworld mix and combust.” 10 Within Lewine’s observation is a thinly veiled diatribe 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Tim Lawrence, “Big Business, Real Estate Determinism, and Dance Culture in New York 1980-88,” 
(Journal of Popular Music Studies, 23.3 2011): 288-306, Print. 
9 Tim Lawrence, “Big Business, Real Estate Determinism, and Dance Culture in New York 1980-88,” 
(Journal of Popular Music Studies, 23.3 2011) 288-306, Print. 
10 Edward Lewine, “Is Downtown Dead?” The New York Times, 25 May, 1997, Web. 
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against the abrupt collision of wealth and nightlife culture. It contemplates the terminus of this 
subculture as a reflection of the greater 1980s and as the impetus for a city transformed.   
 
 
I. The Limelight 
 In the 1980s New York City, Clubland was just on the brink of its emergence while 
Manhattan, specifically the interconnected neighborhoods of East Village, Alphabet City, and 
Lower East Side, was spiraling further into its bankrupt tatters as a result of its economic 
stagnation, deindustrialization, white flight and subsequent urban decay that occurred within the 
1970s. It was a bleak time for the United States’ premier city. Between 1970 and 1980, the 
number of citizens below the poverty line increased by 20% in spite of a 10% decrease in 
population. Between 1980 and 1990, there was an average of 1906 homicides per year.11 As 
described by resident and Details writer Beauregard Houston-Montgomery, who began renting 
an apartment for $100 a month in East Village’s St. Mark’s Place in 1975, “The East Village was 
a challenge because it was literally unlivable. You couldn’t even get near any of the stores 
because the streets were all ripped up”.12 Through New York Magazine writer, Jay McInerney’s 
eyes, Gotham was a place “where muggings and rapes weren’t considered news. The Hells 
Angels ruled East Third Street, and after dark you went east of Second Avenue strictly at your 
own risk. The cops didn’t go there. East Tenth beyond Avenue A was a narcotics supermarket 
where preteen runners scampered in and out of bombed-out tenements. In fact, great swatches of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Marc Vorgna and John McCarthy. “Mayor Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Kelly Announce 2012 
Sets All-Time For Murders and Fewest Shootings in New York City.” News from the Blue Room. 28 Dec. 
2012.  
12 Michel Musto. (Downtown. New York: Vintage, 1986) Print 
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the city were dirty and crime-ridden. Even [the] West Village was pretty gritty by today’s 
standards, and Times Square was a scene of a spectacular squalor”.13 
 
Figure I. Drastic changes in the Lower East Side (Michelle V Agins, New York Times, 2008) 
 
Graffiti and street art covered all surfaces downtown, whether above or under ground within all 
the subway cars. Due to budget cuts, the MTA lacked the appropriate funds for subway 
maintenance. Times Square was rampant with drug dealers, junkies, prostitutes, and lined with 
peepshow and adult sex shops. In Alphabet City, makeshift shacks covered in blue tarp and 
salvaged wood of those displaced by the low-income housing shortage sat next to the rubble of 
decrepit, abandoned apartment buildings. Looking at old photographs of 1980s New York, the 
city is near unrecognizable—more of a war zone reeling from fallout than the international 
powerhouse regarded today. 
  Within the rubble of this urban wasteland came the stomping ground for a burgeoning 
bohemia. Since the 1960s, artists colonized downtown—or more defined by its geographical 
parameters, below 14th street—due to cheap rent and ample vacancies to set up, oftentimes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Jay McInerney. “Yuppies in Eden.” New York Magazine. 28 Sept. 2008. Print 
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illegal, loft and tenement studios. From 1974 and 1984, the price index of New York City 
housing was at a plateaued low. The inexpensive standards of living, however, move beyond the 
ostensible assumptions regarding quality of life and towards an influential collective psychology. 
Artists living in a constant state of poverty indicated that the mentality towards creating art was 
drastically different. As a stark contrast to the art world today, these creatives placed a low value 
on the commerciality of their productions. This contributed to engagement in experimental, 
offensive, and innovative work, that had no intention of appealing to a wide audience and 
disassociated itself from any true utilitarian function. While not completely aligning with the 
stark philosophy of “art for art’s sake,” in which the pure motivation regarding the production of 
work legitimizes the work itself, the slogan in part describes the laissez-faire attitudes of 
creatives in this period. Already operating on limited budgets, artists fiercely sought any means 
necessary to fund their creativity, whether this necessitated stealing or conning, but this also 
eliminated the expectation of art production for profit.14 Further, many claimed that the state of 
America’s political rest, with the end of the Vietnam War, Nixon’s resignation, and the 
economic conditions, produced an anti-establishment arts movement. The radicalism was an 
effort to rebel against the cultural norms set by a society that they viewed failed them. It was in 
these unregulated spaces that artists, musicians, and writers, in an effort to resist traditional art 
forms, bred an activist community, from which punk rock, new-wave, and hip-hop music, no-
wave filmmaking, zines, graffiti painting, and outsider art fluxed. In his exploration of the 
Downtown Art scene, Marvin J. Taylor explains, “Artists worked in multiple media, and 
collaborated, criticized, supported, and valued each other’s works in a way that was 
unprecedented. The new modes of art—whether installation, performance, or a host of others—	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Blank City, Director Celine Dahnier, Perf, Nick Zedd, 2010, Film. 
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opened new paths for all art to follow” 15. This trajectory of creativity embedded in the 
downtown scene continued to attract eccentrics to New York City, and thereby sparked the 
youth-driven counter culture of Clubland.  
   It was the same convictions towards individuality and DIY that the foundations to 
Clubland were constructed. Among the images taken by Alexis Di Biasio, a well-remembered 
scene photographer, there is a forthright celebration of eccentricity. In one photograph, a 
notorious nightclub promoter, Michael Alig is pictured pulling his hand out of a sequined sock, 
dressed in only high-waisted, cheeky white underwear. His nipples are painted turquoise blue to 
match his clown-sized blue lips. He has two different shades of red haphazardly painted across 
his eyes and nose. To complete the look, a string of pearls is fixed onto his upper chest. 16 This 
particular image, taken in 1991, exemplifies the recurrent themes of the club scene uniform: face 
painting, body modification, and self-constructed costumes. Known as “Club Kids,” this was an 
underground movement of outrageously dressed misfits started by James St. James. A misfit 
himself, Michael Alig epitomized the very attraction of this nightlife culture. He grew up as a 
closeted homosexual in South Bend, Indiana who moved to New York City post-high school-
graduation to pursue his interests in fashion and art. The club scene encouraged androgyny, drag, 
and other societally unacceptable manners and behaviors while maintaining a tolerant party 
environment. Through the destruction of a certain appearance-based gender binary, Club kids 
were able to explore the fluidity of identity and authentic self-expression. Fashion, in this sense, 
served as visual art with the artist as both the creator and the medium.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 1Marvin J. Taylor, (The Downtown Book: The New York Arts Scene, 1974-1984, Princeton, NJ, 
Princeton UP, 2006) Print. 
16 Jordan Teicher, “New York’s Fabulous 1980s and ‘90s Club Scene,” The Slate, 12 Mar 2014, Web.  
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Figure II. Michael Alig, 1991 and James St. James, 1990 (Alexis Di Biasio, PAPERMAG, 1991 and 1990) 
 
Dance floors became safe spaces where Club Kids could reveal their latest designs. For 
Richie Rich, founder of the now discontinued label Heatherette, and Leigh Bowery, fashion was 
almost synonymous with individuality. In a 2013 interview, Rich reflected, “I was living in the 
club scene with all my friends. It came purely from a place of designing what we wanted to 
wear—we weren’t following the fashion world”.17 When the retail stores could not accurately 
capture what they wanted to express, Richie, Bowery, and others pushed fashion boundaries by 
entirely hand making every element of their subcultural personalities. This mix of performance 
and costume not only provided a conduit for creative freedom, but it also came with nightlife 
benefits. With each outfit more provocative and impractical than the next, Club Kids made a 
name for themselves, gained notoriety in Manhattan for their eccentric attitudes, and attracted 
several clientele to venues. According to one former Club Kid, people were drawn to the “circus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Maggie Dolan, “Catching Up With Past Nightlife Award Winners: Heatherette,” PAPER, 15 Oct, 2013 
Print.  
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environment” that the Kids created, and promoters showered them with free drinks or free 
admission. As the popularity of this subculture increased, prominent nightlife figures—such as 
the original group of Club Kids—were paid every night for appearing. They drew crowds of 
spectators and imitators, but were known to be able to navigate the social waters with models, 
artists, and hipsters alike. 18 This flexibility with customers landed people like Alig as party 
promoters on the multiple-club payrolls. As mentioned by Clark in his critique of the 
aestheticized lifestyles of urbanites, “nightclubs, whose ambiance is improved by patrons of 
whom being beautiful is a full time job, are not the property of ordinary tourists.” He evaluates 
the role of these Club Kids as those who have “mastered the social codes of privileged 
entertainment spaces so thoroughly that they are paid…they are human props” but this is proves 
to be a blatant trivialization. The “beauty” and “privilege” of Club Kids in his statements are not 
of the traditional variety; they evolved out of a social resistance to reclaim and giving agency to 
the idiosyncrasies of those marginalized. The incentives attached to such behaviors were not an 
intention but an unexpected byproduct. Privilege is not the basis of Clubland’s creation, although 
it is the consequence of its popularity, and these distinctions are important to define.  
At the time, clubs operated seven days a week with a different theme every night, 
providing an endless stream of inspiration and income. Their prevalence reached the extent even 
beyond New York City, Joan Rivers and Phil Donahue invited the original Kids, in full regalia, 
onto their respective talk shows. These personalities dually took advantage of and contributed to 
the creative milieu New York was during the 1980s. While fashion was one artistic outlet, 
partying became another. Michael Alig was credited for leading his hundreds of followers into 
impromptu and illegal parties. These outlaw parties, equipped with only a boom box, took place 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Steve Lewis, “Why Michael Alig Is Still in Jail,” BlackBook, BlackBook, 19 Nov, 2012, Web. 
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in McDonalds, Burger King, subway platforms, or donut shops. The radical fashion and 
performance art these costumed Club Kids embodied is only one specific representation of an 
entire underground culture, albeit one of the most influential. According to James St. James, 
Club Kids prided themselves on breaking barriers and subverting gender stereotypes, “We 
created our own trends, tackled taboos, and lampooned social protocol. Ultimately—and I say 
this with a straight face—I believe we had a destabilizing effect on pop culture as a whole. We 
influenced a whole generation of kids on shows like Geraldo, Phil Donahue, and Ricki Lake”. 19 
In the ‘Nightlife Ephemera’ Exhibition retrospective at Gallery98, Clubland is 
remembered for fostering a strong community in the arts. New nightclubs such as Area, 
Danceteria, Limelight, Palladium, Paradise Garage, and the Tunnel appeared on the 1980s night 
scene, most clustered in Flatiron and the Lower East Side (See Figure VI). Each earnestly strove 
to become more than just a dance hall, but rather a fully integrated arts platform for new music, 
art, film, fashion, video, and performance. 20 Marc H. Miller, a columnist for the East Village 
Eye, remembers the past: 
For artists and performers it was a golden age with clubs needing to book events seven-
days-a-week. To attract the trendy crowd, artists were recruited to paint murals and design 
publicity; curators were hired to organize exhibitions; photographers were booked to present slide 
shows and document events; filmmakers and video arts were paid for screenings; and performers 
were engaged to make music, stage cabaret shows and host interactive events involving audience 
participation. 21 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 James Nicholas, “Art Dark: Meet James St. James, Original Club Kid and Nightlife Icon,” The 
Huffington Post, 14 September, 2014.  
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During this pre-internet era, thousands of invitations and posters displaying the graphic 
design of various artists were cheaply produced and mass printed for promotion. Hired artists 
even experimented with the concept of an invitation. Keith Haring, a New York-specific street 
artist and social activist, designed a jigsaw puzzle to promote a 1985 party at The Palladium. 22 
The Area’s first-ever invite was a within liquid-activated capsules, whereupon guests dropped 
these pills into a glass of water, the vessel would open, and the event details would float to the 
surface. Within clubs like Area, renown for its over-the-top themed parties in 33,000 square ft. 
space, the art department worked obsessively or hired artists to create large-scale, ever-changing 
installations that fit with the event description. For the “American Highway” theme, Area 
constructed an imitation petrol station in the middle of the dance floor. “Alphabet Soup” saw an 
enormous pool of murky red broth and enlarged floating “peas,” “carrots,” and alphabet noodles 
with table servers wading around within. 23 For “Suburbia” Area’s team researcher and buyer 
bought one hundred boxes of cereal, Flutternutter, Goobers, a washer and dryer, plastic 
flamingos, an oak-veneer bedroom set, a toilet, and Astroturf. 24 While this nightlife scene seems 
overly indulgent to some, a hardworking and obsessively imaginative characteristic to 
continually reinvent oneself was at the heart of the counterculture.   
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Figure III. Top left: Pill capsule invitation (Eric Goode and Jennifer Goode, PAPERMAG, 1983-1987); 
Top right: Keith Haring Jigjaw Puzzle Invitation (Kenzo Nakamura, 1985); Bottom two: American 
Highway Theme and Alphabet Soup (Eric Goode and Jennifer Goode, PAPERMAG, 1983-1987). 
 
Music shared the same multi-dimensionalality around nightclubs as the arts did. In an 
interview with the Vulture, Moby—a notable musician and six-time Grammy nominee—
reflected on the odd eclecticism and openness of the music scene as he described what one might 
find in an ideal 1980s nightclub. In Danceteria, he mentions climbing to four different floors 
with four vastly different kinds of music being played at each level: “There was no 
compartimentalization. The hip-hop scene was part of the dance-music scene, was part of the 
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punk-rock scene, was part of the art scene. That to me was the ethos of the time. It’s the ethos 
by which I’ve judged every other counterculture movement.” 25 Venues often had specific genre 
nights on weekly rotation. At Limelight, Pearl Jam and Guns N’ Roses played at rock ‘n’ roll 
night. Smashing Pumpkins and Nine Inch Nails played industrial nights on Tuesdays. The 
Limelight was also the first venue in New York City to play techno, imported from clubs in the 
U.K. Mary J. Blige, Jay-Z, and Puffy performed hip-hop Sunday nights at the Palladium while 
record executives scouted for new talent. 26 Michael Alig claims that nightclubs were incubators 
of culture, whereupon genres of disco, punk, hip-hop, house, techno, electro, acid-house would 
have otherwise not been created. What Moby, seasoned through his teenage exploits in 1980s 
New York, recalls about the culture is, “that on first glance, none of it made any sense. Part of 
the criteria by which it was judged was how effectively did it challenge the viewer or the 
listener”. 27 Placing the fluid Club Kid personas within the megaclub amalgamation of disjointed 
music genres proves a testament to the confusing and exploratory nature of the decade.  
II. After Dark 
  The decadence of subculture may have inspired the creative, but it also spilled over onto 
a darker, destructive side of nightlife. These seven-days-a-week marathon parties were 
physically-demanding and unsustainable without the fuel of rampant drug use. In the 1980s, 
ecstasy had just recently entered the American black market from England, and without clear 
investigation from the FDA, it was an unregulated and, therefore, an unoutlawed drug. 28 By the 
late 1980s, the seemingly benign happiness of ectasy tablets erected a gateway for harder 	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narcotics. The use of cocaine, heroin, ecstasy, and ketamine—whether in single doses or in 
deadly combination, rapidly escalated from recreational use in the 1980s to full-blown addiction 
as the years progressed for many participants in the New York club scene. Concurrent to the 
increasingly severe drug problems, was the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Ground zero for disease-related 
hysteria in the mid-1980s, Club Kids encouraged those who were sick or diagnosed positive to 
party their fear away. James St. James, stated, “There was a prevailing sense that you and your 
friends might not be around this time next week—so enjoy the now! Don’t think about 
tomorrow”. 29 However, these clubs may have been the very places they contracted the disease. 
Hand-in-hand with drug use, club bathrooms and dark corners were used as places to either 
shoot-up with contaminated needles or engage in unprotected sex.  
 The first mention of HIV/AIDS in public media occurred on July 3, 1981. The article 
headlined the unusual outbreak as a “rare cancer seen in 41 homosexuals,” of whom all had 
symptoms of Kaposi’s sarcoma, characterized by purple legions found on the skin, mouth, and 
lymph nodes of disease victims. Two months later, more than 100 gay men had been diagnosed 
with Kaposi’s sarcoma, pneumocytis (a form of pneunomia caused by microfungal organisms) 30, 
or both. Almost half of them had died. In early 1980s New York, city and state government 
officials, along with large media outlets, failed to provide adequate, widespread coverage of the 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome or AIDS epidemic. An absence of circulating public 
information existed regarding the sexual-transmission of the virus. The lack of resources 
available and immobile city services led to the opening of the Gay Men’s Health Crisis, which 
trained clinical volunters, coordinated the city’s only AIDS education sessions, and provided 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 James Nicolas, “After Dark: Meet James St. James, Original Club kid and Nightlife Icon,” The 
Huffington Post, 14 Sept 2014. 30	  Cécile-Marie Aliouat-Denis, Et Al, "Pneumocystis Species, Co-evolution and Pathogenic 
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home nursing care to victims in the disease’s advanced stages. 31 However, operating on a 
limited budget, the GMHC did not have the political nor financial power to create city-wide 
changes. New York State Health Commissioner at the time, David Sencer margionalized AIDS 
as a health problem that he concluded should be kept within the gay community. When asked 
about the initiation of a public health education program, Sencer responded, “I think there are 
ways in which this could be accomplished without taking to the soapbox. I certainly believe that 
the information is going to be better accepted and come from a stronger support if it comes from 
the affected communities themselves.” 32 Sencer represents the majority of public officials who 
refused to recognize or provide support for AIDS services or education, despite rumors of the 
fatal “gay plague” rapidly spreading throughout the city. Doctors and other medical researchers 
attempted to motivate members of New York City Council through planning diversified AIDS 
care alternatives, with no avail. 33 By the conclusion of 1983, the Centers for Disease Control 
had reported 1,092 national AIDS-related deaths out of 2,640 diagnosed cases. 1,042 of those 
national deaths were reported in New York, yet city officials persisted in minimizing the virus’ 
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Figure IV. Reported AIDS Cases and Deaths in NYC, 1981-2012 (New York City Dept. of Health and 
Mental Hygiene, 2013) 
 
Within two years, medical researchers already considered the AIDS “the century’s most 
virulent epidemic.” 35 The occurance of AIDS concentrated primarily in urban areas with large 
gay communities, such as New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.36 Researchers at this time 
also isolated a Human T-cell lymphtropic virus (HTLV-III) and lymphadenopathy associated 
virus (LAV) from infected people with AIDS. Three years later, the former was reclassified 
under a Lentivirus genus, both isolated viruses proved to be identical, and The International 
Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses renamed both HTLV-III and LAV to human 
immunodeficiency virus or HIV. 37 Between 1981 and 1988, the overall incidence of diagnosed 	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AIDS cases in New York increased 68% per year. Given its large size and heterogenous 
composition, the AIDS epidemic affected New Yorkers of both sexes, of all races and ethnicities, 
and in all transmission categories. Among the first 100,000 cases of AIDS diagnosed in the city, 
43% reported having sex with other men and 46% reported intravenous drug use. 38 By this time, 
shared needle transmission exceeded cases of homosexual transmission in the city. Even with 
FDA-approval of zidovudine (AZT), the first anti-HIV drug, in 1987, its $10,000 per yearly 
supply pricetag was far out of reach for most patients. 39 An HIV diagnosis continued to be a 
death sentence for those unable to afford AZT treatment.  
 As New York citizens watched the death toll on what appeared an unstoppable disease 
climb past 13,000 casualties, high-risk behavior among some victims abounded. The city’s 
slothful health policies, societal discrimination, absence of effective vaccines, and lofty mortality 
rates left those infected with little support to cope with their HIV-positive status. Through what 
D. J. McKirnan refers to as “cognitive disengagement,” these people engaged in high-stimulation 
activities such as substance use and unprotected sex as an escape from the realities of their 
illness. McKirnan’s 1996 study of the psychological and socio-medical aspects of AIDS/HIV 
considers the sexual risk of victims, given their “strong negative affect” and thus their “high 
cognitive restraint.” Those affected strategically engage in substance use in order to escape 
stressful self-awareness, however this external stimuli is also responsible for obstructing rational 
behaviors. Alcohol and drugs are examples of such stimuli, readily available in nightclubs, bars, 
and bathhouses, that lead to “a state of cognitive release.” As a result , individuals are able to 
justify HIV-risk behaviors through both a heightened mental state and sexual satisfaction. 	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McKirnan reports, “Thus, a stimulus may become associated both with sexuality, and with 
behaviors that facilitate cognitive avoidance of HIV concern. As with any avoidance response, 
these associations may be difficult to extinguish once learned.” 40 Once these mechanisms of 
avoidance are in place, individuals habitually return to these behaviors to cope with stress, 
loneliness, or arousal. Furthermore, the physical environments themselves become associated 
with such behaviors, abetted by dark lighting, loud music, erotic visual imagery, and a multitude 
of willing, anonymous partners.  
Given the amount of New Yorkers diagnosed throughout the 1980s, McKirnan’s findings 
emphasis the large-scale risk patterns associated with HIV/AIDS in the absence of adequate 
community support. There were few theraputic outlets with which outcast victims could express 
their psychological distress, so instead they took to reliable sexual settings. Kalil Vicioso’s 2005 
study of sex environments and escapism for HIV-positive men substantiates McKirnan’s 
findings with individual narratives. In these testimonies, some participants sought to escape the 
emotional impact of HIV through substances: 
Oh I’ve been very depressed about it. Because we didn’t understand it back then because 
it was just all for aids and we didn’t understand what it was. So, I became depressed suicidal, 
started using drugs and alcohol to cover up the fact that I had this thing in my body and I didn’t 
want to think about it. And I started having more sex to make myself feel better and to also get 
revenge because I was angry. 41 
Others found cognitive escape through sex itself: 
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No one talked. They don’t want to know [about HIV status]. They don’t care and, of 
course I am afraid, but in, in that moment no one cares. I believe I was more at risk… It’s like 
blocking your, your mind. I don’t- at that moment I don’t think. I want fun. I want to, to have 
company… Because it’s an escape. Some people use drugs to escape and I use that. I use that to 
escape. 42 
Many treated their terminal diagnoses as justification to maximize pleasure in the present, which 
is exactly the rationale James St. James encouraged. Victims didn’t want think about tomorrow 
because the future held a grim reality.  
 Some, like Moby, credit the fall of New York City nightlife to rampant drug use and 
AIDS epidemic. Indeed, AIDS claimed a peak of over 8,000 lives in 1993. 43 This conclusion 
may explain the deaths of significant cultural tastemakers and patrons, however it does not give 
credit to the entire scope of city politics and negative press against entertainment venues 
throughout the later 1990s. It also does not clarify the series of oppressive neighborhood 
restrictions and neoliberal policies clubs continue to struggle with to this day. Several of the club 
closures occurred within the duration of the outbreak, as evident in Figure I and Table I, yet the 
decline of this subculture exists within a greater, more complicated narrative. Most nightlife 
denizens and workers give evidence of a multi-layered demise, where gentrification was the final 
nail in the club coffin.  
Gentrification describes a series of economic and social changes to a neighborhood, 
whereupon business investors and real estate developers convert working class or ethnic enclaves 
into desirable properties for affluent, middle-class customers. The original low-income or 
minority residents are displaced in the process. In the context of 1990s New York City, third-	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wave gentrification is often closely associated with the mechanisms of political economy, 
namely neoliberal urbanization. The latter term articulates many of the actions taken by city 
government towards inner city revitilization and reinvestment. This tranformative agenda 
assumes an underlying expectation of capital gains and globilization in the future. Gentrification, 
subsequently, becomes larger than the displacement of long-time community members, but a 
large conversation rooted in, as described by Smith: global finance, the power of the state, 
political tensions, and geographical dispersal. 44 This third-wave is the era of gentrification that is 
accountable for destabilizing nightlife subcultures.  
A complex phenomenon, gentrification in urban areas occurs in gradual stages. Blighted 
1980s New York represents the second-wave. 45 With a focus on downtown Manhattan, creatives 
entered the Lower East Side, originally characterized by abandoned properties, and reinvented 
the sordid neighborhood as a burgeoning arts community. Understanding this “reinvention” as a 
product of a middle-class ideal and early gentrification, it is difficult to rest the initial blame 
entirely on these young pioneers. Those who settled either bought buildings at low cost to repair 
themselves or joined the large community of squatters and artists’ collectives. 46 The differences 
between early and advanced are stark. These creatives, unlike the private developers following 
them, made honest efforts to work with the community. Those who purchased buildings only 
altered the insides of properties and kept old facades and storefront signs to preserve the 
character of the neighborhood. Artist Adam Purple collected the brick rubble of nearby derelict 
tenements and created one of New York City’s largest-scale community gardens, The Garden of 	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Eden. Artist-activists, such as ABC No Rio in 1980, installed “The Real Estate Show” 
exhibition in a vacant building to expose the plight of long-time residents. At this time the Lower 
East Side was an area fraught with drug trafficking, landlord disivestment, and arson, yet ABC 
No Rio organizers noted “but at the same time a new group of real estate speculators were 
moving on the neighborhood, abetted by the city government’s planning and policy, setting the 
stage for a new wave of gentrification.” 47 The Saint’s 1988 closure fits into the later half of 
second-wave gentrification (See Table I). Activists describe city government’s plans to demolish 
gardens and homes of squatters to promote privitized development. The othering of this new 
wave implies that artists did not consider themselves responsible for the prior wave. Moreover, 
artists, who considered themselves in solidarity with the close-knit population, did not contribute 
to a conscious and intention displacement of previous residents. They also became part of those 
who were eventually displaced. Pinning middle class motivations on creatives as a characteristic 
of gentrification undermines their earnest contributions and flattens the contentious dynamics 
between hegemonic officials and artist-activists.  
Dot-com “Silicon Alley" companies and the ascent of the city’s financial sector ushered 
in third-wave, advanced, or neoliberalism-driven gentrification, after five years of recesssion in 
the early 1990s. The closures of Palladium, The Limelight, and the Tunnel all belong within this 
period (See Table I). New York City also rose as a global seat of information, media, cultural 
production. With greater links to large-scale capital and competition for space, city-government 
assisted developers to reshape entire neighborhoods through aggressive municipal policies to 
lure the white, professional “creative” class. Such measures included zoning ordinances, 
restricting noncompatible land uses (such as nightlife activity), and the J-51 tax incentive, a 	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benefits program heavily used in the 1980s and 1990s for multiple-resident building 
rehabilition and often accused of fostering gentrification. 48 New York City’s ravanchism created 
a ripple effect of higher land and housing prices, driven by real estate speculation and diffused 
from its urban center. A new sixty-one unit condominium in the Lower East Side financed by the 
European American Bank and developed by an Israeli company in the 1990s illustrates the 
percolation of global capital and powers of the state into fringe neighborhoods. 49  
In the Furman Center’s 1970-2006 graphs of Lower East Side/ East Village/ Chinatown, 
we see the consistent increase of mean income and educational attainment with sharp descreases 
in poverty rates. Note that increases in both income and education tend to move in tandem. These 
outcomes signify that the previous lower-income and lesser-educated residents are being pushed 
out (See Figure V). 
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Figure V:  Index of Housing Price Appreciation and Mean Income, Educational Attainment, and Poverty 
Rate, CD 303: Lower East Side/Chinatown, Manhattan (The Furman Center, 2008) 
 
Ancillary to such consequences, “underground” or “avant-garde” nomenclature of urban 
subcultures within the Lower East Side became marketing tropes upon the new era of economic 
improvement and hyperconsumerism. In her case study of the Lower East Side, Belkind 
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describes New York’s culture industry appropriating its ample pool of entertainment venues 
into sources of content. 50 This is where the complications in bridging early and advanced 
gentrification arise. Note that early gentrification was distinguished by the intention of blending 
and sustaining existing communities. Later gentrification is criticized for colonizing spaces that 
cater to the wealthy, thus reducing public facilities and low-income support services. 51 Taking 
into account Clark’s “aestheticization of space,” creatives in the third-wave, who originally lived 
a bohemian lifestyle out of political choices, found their way of life marketed as a social 
package. Gentrification thereby assumed a more insidious role in the divorce between artistic 
culture and outsider communities. When urban revitilization pollinated low-rent neighborhoods 
and brought in ambitious investors and real estate speculators, the creatives that lived there faced 
a bifurcated fate: they were forced to move out or the popularity of their bohemian activities, 
upon the expansion age of the culture industry, created new business opportunities for existing 
artistic entrepreneurs. The latter galvanized what used to be a subculture into a utility for 
consumption, thus eroding the very foundation of anti-commerciality that popularized the 
subculture in the first place. Both effects spell death for the subculture, either by breaking up the 
social structure through displacement or dismantling crucial creative ideology.  
The circumstantial propinquity of the AIDS epidemic and gentrification caused both 
issues to collide in the nightlife sector. At The Saint, a Lower East Side gay superclub, owner 
Bruce Mailman fought to keep his venue alive when a large portion of his private membership 
was dying. By the mid-1980s, numbers began to decline by such a noticable degree, Mailman 	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Caused by Gentrification?” Journal of Affordable Housing and Community Development Law 11.4 
(2002): 357-73, Print. 
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chose to allow straight dancers on Thursdays and Fridays and lowered membership costs, to 
make up the loss. At one point, some even referred to AIDS as “Saint’s disease” given its 
prevalence among the club’s clientele. 52 Mailman fought the decline in his customership and 
railed against city government officials, who intended to close his two gay-centric establishments 
including St. Mark’s Baths for community safety. Given the two factors, closure may have 
seemed imminent, but according Saint DJ and confidante of Mailmen’s, Terry Sherman, it was 
an eight-figure offer from a real estate developer that doomed The Saint. The offer not only 
doubled Mailmen’s initial investment, but appeased the club’s investors and provided him an 
escape from the immense overhead costs and stress involved in managing a large-scale club. 53 
The Saint threw its last party in May 1988.  
 The real estate boom struck The Paradise Garage in September 1987 after ten years of 
musical influence, attracting celebrities from Diana Ross, famed Motown singer, to Calvin Klein, 
American fashion designer. 54 The property owner leasing the building of the pop and dance 
discotecque refused to renew the lease. A luxury apartment block was in pre-development next 
to The Garage, and pressure from the neighborhood association and developer prevented another 
ten year run. David DePino, DJ at the club observed, “Neighborhood associations are powerful. 
It’s not something a landlord wants to have problems with.” Owner Michael Brody, claimed a 
discriminative issue: “They don’t want a black club in their neighborhood,” referring to the 
space’s ability to attract mixed races (predominantly Blacks and Latinos) every weekend. 55 
DePino remembers the neighborhood pre-Garage as completely non-residential. It was over the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Randy Shilts, And the Bands Played On: Politics, People and the AIDS Epidemic, (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1987), 500. 
53 Tim Lawrence, “Big Business, Real Estate Determinism, and Dance Culture in New York 1980-88,” 
Journal of Popular Music Studies, 23.3 (2011): 288-306. 
54 Frank Broughton and Bill Brewster, “Larry Levan’s Paradise Garage.” DJ History, 1 Jan 2000, Web. 
55 “Garage Stories,” Paradise Garage, 1 Jan 2005, Web 28 Nov 2014.  
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course of the the venue’s lease, the processes of gentrification took its toll, perhaps also due in 
part to the club’s popularity. Brody resisted the club’s fate, futilely seeking new locations to 
move The Paradise Garage, until he, too became diagnosed with the AIDS virus. 56 
 “When Danceteria opened, 21st Street was in an abandoned neighborhood,” leaseholder 
Rudolf Pieper noted, “You could walk for blocks and not find anything open at night. Then 
gradually, the excitement of New York brought in hordes of moneyed bored from the rest of the 
country and real estate prices went up.” Continuing the trend of nightlife venues pummeled by 
the real estate market, Danceteria closed the doors of its four-floor Manhattan institution in 1986. 
With its avant-garde videotape art on the third floor, the 30 West 21st Street location was often 
inaccessible to most customers and fit in with a specific niche of urban artists. 57 In the midst of 
the mid-1985s, Alex Di Lorenzo, the building’s freeholder, was receiving offers of $25 per 
square foot, while leaseholders Rudolf Pieper and manager John Argento could only rent for 
$1.20 per square foot. A year later, a speculator purchased the lease for $600,000. The location 
now stands as a residential building, housing “apartments of unsurpassed luxury”. 58  
Table I. Nightlife Venues: Address, Establishment Year, Closure Year, and Present 
Establishments 





1018 515 18th Street 1986 1991 Hauser & Wirth 
Contemporary Art Gallery 
Area 157 Hudson 
Street 
1983 1987 Taymour Grahne Gallery 
and residential apartments 
Danceteria 30 West 21st 
Street 
1979 1986 Luxury condominiums 
above NY Stone Manhattan 
The Limelight 656 Avenue of 
the Americas 
1983 2003 (2007 
under “The 
Avalon”) 
Shopping center of 
boutiques and eateries 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Tim Lawrence, “Big Business, Real Estate Determinism, and Dance Culture in New York 1980-88,” 
Journal of Popular Music Studies, 23.3 (2011): 288-306.  
57 Harry Post, “Heart of Darkness,” New York Magazine, 2 May, 1982: 27.  
58 Tim Lawrence, “Big Business, Real Estate Determinism, and Dance Culture in New York 1980-88,” 
Journal of Popular Music Studies, 23.3 (2011): 288-306.  
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Palladium 140 East 14th 
Street 
1985 1997 NYU Dormitories and 
Athletic Center 
Paradise Garage 84 King Street 1977 1987 Verizon Facilities 
The Saint 105 2nd Ave 1980 1988 Emigrant Savings Bank 
Studio 54 254 West 54th 
Street 
1977 1980 Roundabout Theater 
Company Venue Reopened 1981 1986 
The Tunnel 220 12th 
Avenue 
1986 2001 Eastern TV Production 
Company / 54 Below 
Nightclub (in basement) 
Underground 860 Broadway 1980 1989 Petco Pet Store 
The World 254 East 2nd 
Street 
1987 1991 Luxury apartment building 
 
III. Clubbed to Death 
 New residents of the city or the same “moneyed bored” that Pieper refers to resisted the 
influence of club culture in their respective communities. Coalitions such as ‘Save Chelsea’ and 
‘The Save Avenue A Society” consisted of angry community activists preserving the sanctity 
and livability of their neighborhoods. Another measure taken by community boards was 
restricting the number of licenses distributed by the State Liquor Authority in 1993. 59 If three 
liquor-serving licensed businesses existed within a 500-foot area, another request within that 
same area would often be declined. The State Liquor Authority cannot approve similar-type 
license applications under the 500-foot rule without consultation with the community board and 
other interested parties. This entails conducting an open hearing to determine whether issuing the 
license would be of public interest. 60 In cases where the application is met with opposition, 
community members have the bargaining power to leverage specific business conditions in 
exchange for approval. For the local politicians that backed them, support for the anti-nightlife 
movement translated to a large voter base and more “wholesome” publicity, whereas support for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  "Measuring the Distance: The 200 and 500 Foot Rules," New York State Liquor Authority, 2 May 2013, 
Web, 6 Mar 2015. 
60 “Community Board Q&A.” New York State Liquor Authority. Web. 
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nightclub business owners, musicians, DJs, promoters, and patrons only made up a small 
constituency and were painted with negative stereotypes. 61  
Pressure from neighborhood boards on city administration resulted in a the City Planning 
Commission’s (CPC) 1990 rezoning and tightening permit regulation of dance establishments in 
Lower Manhattan. 62 On December 13, 1989 the CPC issued an “Entertainment Use Text 
Amendment,” which includes an overview of proposed changes and comments from Community 
Boards across the city and individuals from the public hearing. The document specifically states 
its intentions to “impose more restrictive regulations on larger entertainment establishments and 
those with dancing” 63,  evidence of which is found through proposals placing limitations on the 
number of “eating or drinking establishments with entertainment and a capacity of more than 200 
persons, or any capacity with dancing (Use Group 12 A)” 64 to occupy commercial and 
manufacturing districts. Under the resolution, it also states that the review was prompted by club-
related noise, traffic, parking, sanitation, and crowding complaints by community residents. 65  
Table II. Overview Table of Modified Zoning Districts 
Adopted Regulations Zoning District  
As-of-right Districts Commercial 
C4* Regional commercial centers located outside 
central business districts (Ex. Specialty and 
department stores, theaters, and other commercial 
and office uses) 
C6** High-bulk commerical uses requiring central 
location 
C7 Large open amusement parks/ Other large open 
and enclosred entertainment facilities (Ex. Skating 
rinks, sports stadiums, miniature gold courses) 
C8 Bridge commercial and manufacturing uses (Ex. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Laam Hae. “Dance in New York City: The Cabaret Law, Alternative Cultures, and Neoliberal 
Urbanism.” Intersection of Rights and Regulation. 1 Jan. 2007: 145-47.  
62 Ibid.  
63 New York City Planning Commission. 1989. Entertainment Use Amendment. (CPC ULURP No. 
890808). New York, New York: CPC Reports Online Database. 1. 
64 Ibid., 8.  
65 Ibid., 2. 
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Automobile showrooms and repair shops, 
warehouses, gas stations) 
Manufacturing 
M1 Light industrial uses (Ex. multistory lofts, one- or 
two- story warehouses, woodworking shops, repair 
shops, storage facilities ) 
M1-5A, M1-5B, 
M1-5M, M1-6M  
SoHo/NoHo- obsolete industrial buildings 
M2 Medium industrial areas. Older waterfront 
industrial areas. 
M3 Heavy industrial areas that generate noise, traffic, 
or pollutants (Ex. Power plants, solide waste 





C2 Commercial districts largely residential in 
character (Ex. Grocery stores, dry cleaners, drug 
stores, restaurants, clothing stores) 
C3 Waterfront recreational facilities (Ex. Bicycle 
shops, ice cream stores, public/private beaches) 








Light industrial district within growing residential 
communitites with special rules 
Not Permitted  Commercial 
C1 Commercial districts predominantly residential in 
character 
C5 (permitted in 
hotels) 
Central commercial districts with continuous retail 
frontage for offices and retail establishments  
*C4 - minimum 4 sq. ft. of waiting area required and use must be minimum 100 from nearest 
residence zone, except that where such establishment is less 
** In C6-1, C6-2, C6-3, C6-4, minimum of 4 sq ft. waiting area required, and entrance must be 
minimum of 100 from nearest residence zone 
Source: New York City Department of City Planning 
 
Table III. Summary Table of Proposed Entertainment Venue Use Group Changes 
(February 8, 1990) 
Use Prior Regulations 
(before 2/8/90) 
Proposed Regulations  
(as voted by CPC) 
Adopted Board of Estimate (BOE) 66 
Modifications (as of 2/8/90) 
Eating or - as-of-right: C4, C6, - as of right: C6*, C7, C8, - as-of-right: C4*, C6**, C7, C8, M1 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The New York City Board of Estimates, a governmental body responsible for citywide budget and 
land-use matters, was abolished after August 27, 1990 after the United States Supreme Court ruled its 
voting principals unconstitutional. The Board served as a precursor to the current City Council with 
review, modification, and veto powers over CPC actions.  









C7, C8, and most M 
districts 
- special permits: C2, 
C3, M1-5A, M1-5B 
- not permitted in C1 
or C5 (permitted in 
hotels in C5) 
M1 (except M1-5A, M1-
5B, M1-6M,), M2, M3 
- special permits: C2, C3, 
C4, M1-5A, M1-5B, M1-
5M, M1-6M, LMM) 
- not permitted in C1 or C5 
(permitted in hotels in C5) 
* in C6-1, C6-2, C6-3, C4-
6, minimum of 4 sq. ft. of 
waiting area required and 
entrance must be minimum 
of 100 from nearest 
residence zone 
(except M1-5A, M1-5B, M1-5M, M1-
6M), M2, M3 
- special permit: C2, C3, C4*, M1-5A, 
M1-5B, M1-6M, LMM 
- not permitted in C1 or C5 (permitted in 
hotels in C5) 
* in C4, minimum 4 sq. ft. of waiting 
area required and use must be minimum 
100 from nearest residence zone, except 
that where such establishment is less 
than 100 ft. from the nearest residence 
district a special permit may be granted 
in accordance with Section 73-244 
** In C6-1, C6-2, C6-3, C6-4, minimum 
of 4 sq ft. waiting area required, and 
entrance must be minimum of 100 from 
nearest residence zone 
Source: New York City Planning Commission, 1990 
 
As evident in Tables II and III, businesses would be allowed in “C6, C7, C8 and most 
manufacturing districts” 67—meaning specific commercial areas with high bulk commercial uses 
were among the few places nightclubs could locate without an additional permit. Businesses 
located below residential buildings (C2), on waterfront recreational community facilities (C3), in 
regional commercial centers (C4), within multistory lofts mapped in SoHo/ NoHo (M1-5A and 
M1-5B), residential space in industrial buildings in Chelsea (M1-5M and M1-6M), and the 
Lower Manhattan Mixed Use Districts required additional special permits for business operation, 
whereas none were previously needed. In particular high-bulk commercial areas, mainly the 
outer business districts of Lower East Side and Chelsea neighborhoods of C6-1, C6-2, C6-3, and 
C6-4 Districts, establishments were mandated to provide at least four square feet of interior 
waiting area per person permitted under the occupant capacity. Extra space outside the entrance 
was compulsory to keep a minimum of 100 feet from the nearest residential district, the main 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Ibid.,7. 
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concern behind these changes being the community’s protests against pedestrian congestion 
and sound levels. The resolution also includes “appropriate controls to minimize adverse effects 
on the character of the surrounding area, including, but not limited to, location of entrances and 
operable windows, provision of sound-lock vestibules, specification of acoustical insultation, 
maximum size of establishment, kinds of amplification of musical instruments or voices…” 68 
Community Board Review, a series of neighborhood recommendations throughout 
Manhattan and the outer boroughs, are also considered within the document. The original text 
mandated that any places with dancing close by 12:30 AM weekdays and 2:00 AM Fridays and 
Saturdays would be within the jurisdiction of C4 and C6, and special permits required for 
Districts M1-5A and M1-5B. The Community Board Number 1, Manhattan, voted all dance 
clubs be required to file for special permits, given “Use Group 12 [large entertainment venues 
with dancing] are difficult to live near no matter what their hours of operation.” 69 The 
Community Board Number 5, Manhattan, modified the resolution of cabarets with wording later 
echoed by Giuliani’s mayoral campaign. It states, “that the abatement of quality of life 
infringements resulting from large discos and clubs being of primary concern, that the 
language…must include provisions for strict compliance with noise mitigation…provisions of 
sound lock vestibules, specification of acoustical insultation…” 70 
The remainder of the report details the tensions between the Community Board and the 
New York Cabaret Association, in which Board members primarily benefit from the proposed 
changes, which disproportionately impacted the viability of Association businesses. Taking into 
account drastic court decisions including, but not limited to, expensive soundproofing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Ibid., 8.  
69 Ibid., 11.  
70 Ibid., 11. 
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installation, indoor waiting area construction, the opportunity costs of obtaining a special 
permit, and less as-of-right zoning for clubs with full operating hours, the representatives from 
the Association, the American Federation of Musicians, Local 802, nightclub directors, party 
promoters and planners, and musicians strongly, albeit unsuccessfully, challenged the 
amendments at a Public Hearing on June 21, 1989. A representative from the Association 
provided his justification on the grounds that, “few individuals will invest the considerable sums 
necessary for building new nightclubs while not knowing in advance whether or not a special 
permit will be granted and, if granted, then only for a maximum of three years.” 71 Speakers 
often cited the potential of adverse economic effects on the nightclub industry as cornerstone to 
their arguments against requirements of special permits and an expansion of locations where 
such permits would be required. They asserted that the “time consuming, costly, and 
unpredictable” process of obtaining a three-year special permit would render the possibility for 
long term business investment impossible, as well as reduce the number of new entertainment 
ventures in the City. 72  
Speakers at the Public Hearing also took objection to the stipulation requiring venues to 
secure the landlord’s consent before renewal of the special permit, stating that permission from 
the building owner often comes at a high cost to club owner.73 Revisiting cases as The Paradise 
Garage and Danceteria, where Neighborhood associations and landlords have had contentious 
relationships with nightclubs, as well as examining the Manhattan Community Board 
testimonies, reveals the difficulties of reaching agreeable consensus. Evidence demonstrates 
Board members disliked the existence of afterhour businesses, therefore the power of community 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Ibid.,18. 
72 Ibid., 20. 
73 Ibid., 20. 
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organizations manifested in either stringent amendments or pressure on the landlord to hinder 
lease renewal.  
In the final zoning resolution resolved by the City Planning Commission, all amendments 
passed despite night sector objections, except for those inhibiting the full operating hours of new 
as-of-right area clubs in all C6 Districts. The Board of Standards and Appeals, appointed to 
oversee the applications of special permits designated in commercial and manufacturing districts, 
commented, “In granting special permits, the Board is accorded broad discretion and may 
impose conditions on the special permit use.” 74 The restrictive language in the statement 
underscores an ominous future for New York City nightlife.  
 Requests for special zoning permits now necessitate filing a BZ application to the City of 
New York Board of Standards and Appeals (BSA). To date, the application includes a lengthy 
form encompassing: Department of Building Objections, Affidavit of Ownership, Statement of 
Facts, Statement of Findings, Certificate of Occupancy, Zoning Map, BSA Zoning Analysis 
Form, Tax Map, Radius Diagram/ Land Use Map, Photographs, Existing Condition Plans, List of 
Affected Property Owners and Tenants, and an additional City Environmental Quality Review 
(CEQR) Application. 75 The filing fees of special permits range from $2,960.00 square feet or 
less of floor/ lot area to $7,580.00 in excess of 100,000 square feet of floor area. 76 The CEQR 
Land Use and Environmental filing, which must be included with the BZ Special Permit filing, 
includes: Land Use Application, Land Use Supplemental Form, Attachment 2- Site Data, 
Attachment 3 – Project, Official Zoning Map, Tax Maps, Project Area Photographs, Survey, 
Zoning Analysis, Site Plan (used for presentations to the Commission), Statement of Findings, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Ibid., 30. 
75 “Checklist for BZ Applications,” NYC Board of Standards and Appeals, 1 Sept 2010, Web. 76	  “Schedule of Current Filing Fees Pursuant to §25-202 of the Administrative Code of the City of New 
York,” NYC Board of Standards and Appeals, 11 July 2011, Web.  
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Owner’s Authorization, as well as a number of action specific attachments or project- based 
considerations and a non-refundable fee.  
The action of imposing zoning sanctions on entertainment venues and mandating a 
lengthy and expensive process by which to approach a cultural enterprise, when before none 
existed, is oxymoronic to the uninhibited attributes clubs became famous for. The act of 
suppressing a culture is readily apparent, in spite of what the Commission ostensibly concurs, 
that “nightclubs and dancing establishments serve an important role in the cultural life of this 
city. They should not only be accepted, but encouraged. At the same time they should be good 
neighbors at appropriate locations.” 77 To claim that dancing establishments were not only 
accepted, but encouraged, would be inaccurate. If anything, they were marginally tolerated. 
Nightlife ventures and overhead were already considerably exorbitant and clubs were not 
necessarily guaranteed to succeed, but compounded with community board approvals, specific 
construction requirements, short-term special permits and, later expanded upon, cabaret licenses, 
the stakes for founding new New York City clubs climbed much higher.  
Zoning ordinances are powerful methods by which proprietors and city officials can exert 
control. By prioritizing some land-use activities in residential and industrial areas more 
important than others, the City Planning Commission, in coordination with the City Council, 
Mayor’s office, local politicians, and Community Boards, are able to sculpt the municipality as 
they see fit. The interconnected nature of zoning recommendations and approvals through these 
regulatory systems prevent socially stigmatized or disenfranchised groups from intervening or 
amending proposals, as seen in the Public Hearing. Special Permits have historically been a 
sugarcoated method for the CPC to stifle certain land uses, without declaring them strictly off-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Ibid., 30. 
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limits. This maneuver allows the CPC and Community Boards to appease potential resistance 
while exerting political leverage in any future land-use negotiations. 78 
The 1990 Entertainment resolution, which since has not adopted any drastic amendments, 
continues to inconvenience the lives of New York venue owners. Navigating the city 
bureaucracy is what Alex Baumol, real estate broker of Sankeys NYC, 79 cites as particularly 
problematic. “The real challenge,” he explains, “is getting a raw, new space that isn’t licensed 
and requires build-out. That takes lots of money and time. And there’s a risk that the deal will 
never consummate. You go forward pending community board approval. The landlord says you 
don’t have anything until you get that, but the tenant wants to lock up the space. Both sides are 
right, but it’s a headache right off the bat. And no one is going to pay you commission until the 
CB [Community Board] approves.” 80 It took Andrew W.K., co-owner of Santos Party House, 
four years to fully establish his downtown club. He reflected, “It felt like you were going through 
a labyrinth. You had to prove yourself to the city, the [State Liquor Authority], community 
boards, and really, yourself that you could even do this. After that we had a lot more respect for 
how difficult it was. And actually running the club was comparatively easy.” 81  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Laam Hae, The Gentrification of Nightlife and the Right to the City: Regulating Spaces of Social 
Dancing in New York, Hoboken, NJ: Tyler & Francis, 2012, 46.  
79 Sankeys is a twenty-year- old dance franchise founded in Manchester, England with 2013 roots in 
Manhattan. It has since closed. 
80 Billy Gray, “The Agony and the Ecstasy of Opening a NYC Nightclub,” The Commercial Observer, 5 
Nov 2013, Web.  
81 Ibid. 
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Figure VI. Nightclubs Establishments: Locations Past and Present 
• Black markers indicate clubs prior to the 1990 Entertainment Amendments. Gray markers 
indicate the locations of present-day popular clubs.  
 
Table IV. Present-Day Nightclub Locations and Zoning Districts 
 
Nightclub Street Address Zoning District 
1 Oak 453 West 17th Street #1 C6-3 (Commercial As-of-right)* 
Amnesia NYC 609 West 29th Street  M1-6 (Manufacturing As-of-right) 
Cielo 18 Little West 12th Street M1-5 (Manufacturing As-of-right) 
The Griffin 50 Gansevoort Street M1-5 (Manufacturing As-of-right) 
Le Bain 848 Washington Street M1-5 (Manufacturing As-of-right) 
Marquee New York 289 10th Avenue C6-3 (Commercial As-of-right)* 
Output 74 Wythe Avenue M1-2 (Manufacturing As-of-right) 
Pacha NYC 618 West 46th Street M2-4  (Manufacturing As-of-right) 
Space Ibiza New York 637 West 50th Street M2-4 (Manufacturing As-of-right) 
Verboten 54 North 11th Street M1-2 (Manufacturing As-of-right) 
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* In C6-1, C6-2, C6-3, C6-4, minimum of 4 sq ft. waiting area required, and entrance must be 
minimum of 100 from nearest residence zone 
 
The zoning changes limiting which districts dance clubs are able to operate as-of-right 
also change real estate dynamics. Nightclubs typically avoid special-permit areas in favor of 
more desirable commercials and manufacturing zones, similar to present day clubs within the 
Meatpacking District or near the Williamsburg waterfront. Currently all of the most popular 
dance clubs in New York City such as Cielo, Pacha, 1 Oak, and Le Bain are in as-of-right 
districts. M1 and M2 districts eliminate the necessity for Community Board approval, but even 
the spaces themselves come with a fair share of caveats. Approval by these neighborhood 
associations is still required for cabaret and liquor license applications. The Alcohol Beverage 
Control Law mandates businesses applying for on-premises license notify their community board 
thirty days before filing to the State Liquor Authority. Proof of the notice is included with the 
application. The board is then able to submit an opinion to the SLA, which is recorded in the 
filing and used by the Authority to decide licenses. 82 As these boards have considerable sway in 
the decision, they are often the biggest obstacles for potential venue owners. Additionally, even 
in the neighborhoods where new spaces are eligible for cabaret licenses, heavy competition for 
M1 and M2 development means the owners abstain from long-term fifteen year and twenty year 
leases in hopes of selling to a future developer. 83  
Clashes between city government and nightlife grew by the end of the 1990s. A case 
against two venues owned by “King of New York Clubs”, Peter Gatien, further scandalized and 
increased hostility against Gotham nightlife. Accused of operating two major “drug bazaars” and 
arrested in 1996, the club magnate became a target for the United States and New York City drug 	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enforcement. The Federal government charged Gatien with conspiring and distributing 
MDMA within his two establishments. The U.S. Attorney’s Office aimed to jail Gatien for 
eleven years, punishment for the pills bought and sold in his clubs. While Gatien did not 
personally conspire with or receive profits from drug dealers on his premises, he also failed to 
prevent them, thus benefiting from the excess pool of customers. Michael Caruso, or “Lord 
Michael” as he was known in the downtown club scene, was an example of one of these vendors. 
The Staten Island transplant imported ecstasy tablets and rave culture from London and directly 
into places like The Limelight. From party invitations with “x” and “e” in direct reference to 
MDMA to serving 200-pill strong ecstasy punch at the DJ booth, Lord Michael’s Future Shock 
Fridays were powered by flagrant drug use and techno music. Gatien turned a blind eye. Caruso, 
found guilty for wholesale drug trafficking and a stream of other felonies including home 
invasion and bank robbery, testified against Peter Gatien in exchange for leniency. In his plea he 
also describes “Emergency Room” parties at the Limelight, where party promoters role-played as 
doctors and wrote out fictitious “prescriptions” of cocaine and Ecstasy for club patrons inside a 
mock medical tent. 84  
Given the circumstances, city officials easily cited the three undercover drug buys within 
New York City’s Nuisance Abatement Law to close The Limelight and The Tunnel for up to a 
year. Sean Kirkham, the Drug Enforcement Administration confidential informant accountable 
for the club closures, claims that in his six years working for the DEA once a business is targeted 
it becomes impossible to prevent its shuttering. Kirkham explains that a DEA agent can phone a 
drug dealer to enter the premises of a business, make a transaction in the agent’s presence, and 
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such an action is enough to close a venue. 85 It was suspected that this action was taken 
against the Limelight and the Tunnel to prevent Gatien from affording his defense. One of his 
four enterprises, Palladium, had to be sold to bear the expense of the trial. In 1997, it was 
purchased and demolished to make way for Palladium Athletic Facility by New York University.   
Publicist for The Limelight and The Tunnel, Bruce Lynn, claims that attendance at these 
venues was from five thousand to ten thousand people every weekend. The sheer volume of 
traffic prevented thorough drug regulation. At the time of the investigation, Peter Gatien 
managed four clubs at the same time, meaning he was held with full criminal responsibility for 
what narcotic deals went on at any given time, whether he was present or otherwise. Michael 
Alig claims, “Every single club was saturated with Special K… crystal meth, ecstasy, and 
cocaine, but they didn’t have an evil, sinister eye-patched figurehead at the helm.” 86  
Running concurrent Gatien’s two-and-a-half year drug-racketeering investigation was yet 
another narcotics-related arrest—Michael Alig’s murder of drug dealer Angel Melendez. A 
financial drug dispute between the two men quickly escalated into Melendez violently shaking 
and choking Alig while pounding him against the wall, threatening to kill him. Robert “Freez” 
Riggs, a fellow Club Kid answered his pleas for help by grabbing a hammer and striking 
Melendez three times over the head. All three men were high on ketamine on the night of the 
crime. Alig remembers recently coming off a four-day binge of cocaine, Special K, heroin, and 
crystal meth. In a drug-induced haze, Alig’s and Riggs’ testimonies deviate: Alig claims to have 
poured Drano down Melendez’s throat and then proceeded to duct-tape his mouth closed. Riggs 
claimed to have filled a syringe with Drano and injected the fluid into Melendez’s veins. The 
corpse was left propped in the bathtub for a week until Alig finally reached an agreement with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Limelight, Director Billy Corben, Magnolia Pictures, 2011, Film. 
86 Ibid. 
	   48	  
Riggs: after ordering twenty bags of heroin and buying a pair of butcher’s knives from 
Macy’s, they would dismember Melendez’s body. Then together the Club Kids hauled and 
disposed the decomposing remains of their former drug dealer into the Hudson River. 87 Rumors 
circulated around Angel’s disappearance throughout the nightlife sector. Alig himself even 
boasted about the event at dinner parties, but police were too focused on Peter Gatien and, given 
Alig’s history of outrageous behavior, everyone assumed his role in the murder to be either a 
prank or “some kind of performance art.” 88 When the body finally washed up in November 
1996, Riggs immediately confessed and Alig was arrested in a New Jersey hotel. Both pleaded 
guilty to manslaughter and were sentenced to ten to twenty years in prison. Michael Alig had 
previously worked for Gatien as a party promoter, and stood to be a key witness in his trial until 
his arrest. 89  
In his New York Post exclusive, he remembers the beginning ideology of his Club Kid 
lifestyle, “In the early days…it was really quite beautiful and positive. We helped the 
disillusioned and the disenfranchised believe in themselves—the gay kid from Iowa who didn’t 
dare tell anyone for fear of being mocked.” 90 But by the mid-1990s, Clubland—like its 
figurehead, Alig—had descended into darkness. Initially, Michael Alig asserted that at the 
beginning of his rise he had been anti-drug. Peter Gatien concurred that in the early years of their 
working relationship, Alig had stayed away from drug use. That was, until he began to dabble in 
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heroin. 91 The provocateur quickly turned into a junkie, stating he landed himself in the 
hospital twice for nearly overdosing on a cocktail of heroin, cocaine, ecstasy, and ketamine. 92 
Michael Alig’s headlining narrative is one echoed by the many artists and designers that lost 
themselves to drug addiction and mirrors the rapid demise of Manhattan nightlife. What was 
initially intended to be a decadent subculture founded on creativity, community, and social 
tolerance careened into dangerous self-indulgence.  
Gatien won an innocent verdict against the Federal government, but he was found guilty 
in his next battle with the State of New York for tax evasion. His run-ins with the law set a 
precedent for the club owners at large, and also changed the way Gatien continued to operate his 
own businesses. During his five-year sentence under probation, he made an effort for a clean 
return to Clubland. Peter Gatien hired Robert Silbering as security monitor for the Tunnel. For 
the first time, businesses adopted strict measures such as scanning IDs to prevent underage 
attendees, employing undercover security guards, placing cautionary signs against drug use 
outside entrances, using metal detectors, and conducting full body searches in an effort to 
prevent nit-picky club closures. Deterred by the level of club security, patrons took their business 
elsewhere. 93  
Once the subculture criminalized itself on national headlines, gentrification was rapidly 
eating into the fabric of nightlife. From 1996 to 2006, Manhattan experienced a 185% increase in 
housing prices. 94 New residents of Manhattan railed against the socially abherrent and criminal 
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behaviors—public drunkeness, vandalism, and street noise—that were readily attributed to 
clubs. Places such as The Tunnel, one of the last places Gatien fought to keep open, came under 
fire for these very complaints within the Chelsea neighborhood where it was located. In this 
community, these claims introduce the question of race issues. At The Tunnel, Hip-hop nights on 
Sunday was the most successful of weekly musical events. The patronage was predominantly 
African American, who walked from the subways through upper class neighborhoods to reach 
the club. According to the 10th Precinct, Hip-hop nights had a higher incidence of crime. It 
gained a reputation for violence and Peter Gatien was issued an ultimatum. Either he changed the 
night to a different theme—even shut down specifically on Sundays—or he would face the 
consequences of his patrons’ behavior. Peter Gatien, who owed more than a million in back taxes 
on both Federal and State levels, recognized that no other genre in 1999 was as relevant as Hip-
hop and that he could not afford to lose the money from Sunday admissions. The police 
inevitably claimed the nightclub. Gatien was forced to sell his remaining businesses and file for 
bankruptcy.95  
The aftermath of Gatien’s trials reverberated throughout the after hours sectors. Due to 
negative exposure of owners and clientele alike, City Hall and other departments closely targeted 
club life. Proprietors of nightlife establishments accused the NYPD and city officials of 
harassment regarding noise and traffic violations. They claimed complaints only occurred after 
the advent of gentrification, in neighborhoods originally settled by club owners. A scene usually 
fraught with competition, owners started The New York City Cabaret Association in July 1996 
to make amends with city departments. 96 David Herskovits, editor in chief of Paper Magazine—	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a publication whose survival is contingent on nightlife advertising—, in part founded the trade 
group to address rising concerns of club closures.  “Anything construed as trendy or hip that will 
attract too many people or the wrong kind of people has a real problem.” Herskovits claimed a 
stigmatization of nightclub attendees. City officials also offered their opinions. Despite club 
intentions to turn a profit, City Council member Kathryn E. Freed placed greater weight on the 
her constituents ability to sleep at night. Captain Thomas Lawrence of the 10th Precinct in 
Chelsea also cites pressure from the community board that leads to strict law enforcement. 
Captain Lawrence refuted the claims of harassment, citing NYPD’s more assertive measures as a 
way to show the community board their proaction.97 The collaborative efforts of owners and city 
officials over neighborhood demands not only manifested in operational restrictions, but the 
marketing strategies towards wealthier patrons. Under fire for recurring instances of fights and 
killings, an inherently classist and racist language began to tinge improvements to the nightlife 
landscape. The Underground serves as an example of such shifts. As a club known for its 
concerning rates of street violence and a concentration of police monitoring, community leaders 
feared the crime surrounding the Underground would deter people from moving into the Union 
Square neighborhood, of which has experienced unprecedented economic growth concurrent to 
the park’s renovation. The Underground is among several clubs, including the World, 1018, The 
Tunnel, Studio 54, that insisted the police targeted businesses with racially mixed clientele. In an 
ongoing battle against the authorities, the World lost its liquor license. 1018 and The Tunnel shut 
its doors. Studio 54 changed its name to the Ritz and became a rock concert venue. 98 The 
Underground responded to pressure similarly. Managers hinted that it had intentions of drawing 	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“an older, more affluent crowd” by replacing its weekly Friday reggae nights in favor of pop 
music. 99 It soon changed its name to La Palace de Beauté. Under a different moniker, the newly 
“upscale” business catered to “young hip kids” and models. 100 Clubs like Studio 54 and the 
Underground serve as the beginning of a wider nightlife phenomenon focused on racially and 
socioeconomically exclusionary measures. Such solutions to crime emphasize more than simple 
neighborhood conflicts, but rather the effects of gentrification on the club world, both external 
and internal. Whitening and up-scaling dance culture demonstrates what Deborah Talbot, UK 
professor of emergence of nighttime economies, refers to as “spatial and subcultural closure.” 
The term describes the systematic sanitization of racial or ethnic minority contributions to 
nightlife. Once purged, the creative and experimental facets of the subculture also suffer, after 
surrendering much of its character and conforming to upper middle-class tastes. The cancellation 
of events attracting predominantly African American crowds such as reggae and hip-hop nights 
informs this conclusion. This process, observed in such places as the Underground, provides a 
critical narrative with which to observe all conflicts between nightlife figures and New York City 
government. 101 
 Several cultural players as David Herskovits, Peter Gatien, and Michael Alig attested to 
the expansion of anti-nightlife procedures through Rudy Giuliani’s quality-of-life campaign. 
Thomas Onorato, who later worked as doorman for such parties as Misshapes and Motherfucker 
102, was fifteen when he first started attending The Limelight and Palladium. Onorato witnessed 
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the rapid evolution of nightlife under Giuliani’s mayoralty and states that smaller clubs 
suffered the effects of his newly instated cabaret laws the most. After national coverage of The 
Limelight started to wane, Onorato reports that the Mayor “went on a warpath” and aggressively 
policed all types of art or entertainment venues. “I watched tons of people who chose nightlife as 
their career get torn apart.” 103    
During Giuliani’s 1994-2001 term, population in the city grew 9.4% from 1990 to 2000 
104, crime was at an all-time low, but it was with an iron-fisted rule and punitive measures that 
these changes occurred. Rudy Giuliani’s term marked the rise of the NYPD, a force that 
increased by 35%. Such scorched earth policies manifested itself on all levels of crime. In 1990, 
misdemeanor arrests and felony arrests rose to 70%. Robberies, motor vehicle theft, and 
homicides percentages all fell. Crime rates dropped in New York City more than rates in the 
entire United States. 105 In his public statement titled, ‘The Next Phase of Quality of Life: 
Creating a More Civil City’ Giuliani claimed, “Obviously murder and graffiti are two vastly 
different crimes. But they are part of the same continuum, and a climate that tolerates one is 
more likely to tolerate the other.” 106 The scope of the mayor’s crackdown spanned to the 
nightlife sector, where recreational drug use, drug trafficking, and also chronic disturbances ran 
rampant. Giuliani may have been the impetus in creating a safer New York, but he is also 
accused of criminalizing the city’s nightlife.  
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Compared to Giuliani, his predecessors Ed Koch and David Dinkins (1990-1993) were 
significantly more reasonable with nightlife policing. When Mayor Koch took office in 1978, 
deindustrialization and depopulation in New York City was still underway. Nightlife 
establishments were one of the few industries well anchored as a tourist attraction in the city’s 
economy.107 In Mayor Dinkins’ term, in spite of the neighborhood opposition to club presence, 
he did little to intervene and left most political action to the appropriate city agencies. The most 
notable action Dinkins took was after an arson attack killed 87 people at Happy Land Social 
Club in 1990. Two years earlier, the two-story Bronx venue had been ordered to vacate after its 
violation of building and fire safety codes, but a miscommunication between the local fire 
department and City Buildings Commissioner meant follow-up procedures never occurred. An 
adequate sprinkler system, light-up exits, and a number of other emergency equipment were not 
installed in the building. The tragedy motivated Dinkins to investigate the statuses of 176 other 
clubs with building violations. 108 He quickly increased the number in his nightlife task force, a 
team originally assembled by the Koch Administration after a similar fire-related tragedy in 
1988. The task force’s intentions were straightforward: to search neighborhoods for illegal after-
hours clubs and to shut them down. Through Dinkins’ efforts, the team found 1,391 
entertainment venues and padlocked 505. The Mayor also pushed through more stringent laws 
penalizing illegal club landlords. Thirteen weeks later, Dinkins demonstrated that the project had 
achieved its mission and reduced task force teams back down to ten. He claimed that maintaining 
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the expanded force would be a “waste of resources.”109 We see that even in extreme nightlife 
emergencies, Dinkins’ treatment towards venues was within reason. Giuliani’s, on the other 
hand, was a direct attack. 
Richard Goldstein’s 1997 article, “Whose Quality of Life Is It, Anyway?” highlights the 
citizens that take the brunt of Giuliani’s campaign. Despite New York’s rectified reputation, 
Blacks, Hispanics, homosexuals, and the lower class have been continually targeted and 
implicated in crime by the NYPD. 110 Nightlife business owners and patrons are another segment 
of the city that Giuliani has fought a battle against. His mayoralty was characterized by 
penalizing lower-level crimes in order to reclaim public spaces. During his eight-year 
administration, Giuliani revived the prohibition-era cabaret law—initially intended by Mayor 
Jimmy Walker to restrict interracial mixing occurring in uptown dance clubs—to curtail the ill 
effects of nightlife in said public spaces. The New York City Administrative Code, Chapter 2: 
Licenses, Subchapter 20: Public Dance Halls, Cabarets, and Catering Establishments states that a 
“Cabaret” by definition is “any room, place or space in the city in which any musical 
entertainment, singing, dancing, or other form of amusement is permitted in connection with the 
restaurant business or the business of directly or indirectly selling to the public food or drink, 
except eating or drinking places, which provide incidental musical entertainment, without 
dancing, either by mechanical devices, or by not more than three persons.” 111 The mandate 
requires that specifically zoned “cabaret” businesses apply for license renewal every two years 
for a fee of up to $1,300. 112 This license is entirely different than such zoning ordinances 	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discussed earlier in the chapter. Given the influence of community boards on government-
issued licenses, obtaining an additional cabaret license on top on a liquor license often proved to 
be impossible. Enacting this 1926 law legitimized the aggressive oversight of nightclubs by the 
nightlife inspection city agents. 
In 1995, Multi-Agency Response to Community Hotspots (MARCH), a cooperative 
effort between FDNY, NYPD, DOB, and DCA agencies, was created to make routine, 
unexpected nightlife inspections throughout New York City. Unlike its former model, Mayor 
David Dinkins’ Social Club Task Force, which aimed to regulate unlicensed businesses for the 
purpose of safety concerns in the aftermath of a social club arson, Giuliani’s new team monitored 
both legal and illegal establishments. 113 The Task Force became notorious for what some 
referred to as “creative ticketing,” 114 or rather an overly critical interpretation of the law. Such 
infractions could include an ice scooper touching an ice cube, an obstructed window view, fruit 
flies on cocktail fruits, or the advertising of bands on power line poles. 115 This ‘cabaret’ edict 
also effectively maintains (as it is still in practice) that it is illegal for any business owner to have 
group dancing in his or her establishment without a license, meaning that even the accidental 
rhythmic moving of four people could result in fines and closures. Between August 1996 and 
August 1998, the Task Force closed 50-60 nightclubs. 116 Considering the rate of club closures 
yearly since Giuliani’s term, often for minor infractions, the number of businesses holding 
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cabaret licenses have since dropped to 179 in 2008 from 12,000 in 1960. 117 One of these 
places included Twilo, a Chelsea venue with an invalid basement assembly permit. This was not 
the first time the club had run-ins with the law. After a patron overdosed on ecstasy, the Giuliani 
administration had been after Twilo since November 1998. Twilo frequenters were unfazed by 
the building violations and cited it as a thinly veiled way to force the club out of business. One 
customer took to Twilo’s online messaging platform, calling the cited infractions “excuse to 
ensure that there are no bumps in the road in Giuliani’s Disney-gentrification plan to have NYC 
become an ultraconservative suburb.” 118  
In Giuliani’s ‘quality of life’ campaigning, nightclubs needed to be a necessary target. 
The sterilization of public spaces for the purposes of global capital real estate investment by the 
city government added to the effects of gentrification. 119 Taking into consideration the meaning 
of real estate values on the economic viability of a city, ‘a safer city’ meant that Giuliani pushed 
along a neoliberal agenda towards a gentrified city, in order to attract tourists and appease 
inhabitants. Dinkins may not have taken an aggressive stance on nightlife, but both Giuliani and 
Dinkins administrations have steadily sanitized New York City. Dinkins razed several squatted 
tenements in the Lower East Side and evicted all the homeless residents of Tompkins Square 
Park in January 1990. 120 Upon his election, Giuliani took to accelerating the declination of 
nightlife.   
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In his 1998 press release, titled ‘The Next Phase of Quality of Life: Creating a More 
Civil City,’ Giuliani reflects upon his contributions in the city’s drastic turn-around: “The sum of 
all the quality of life initiatives is that an increasing number of people are optimistic about the 
City’s future… that’s why more and more people want to live in New York City.” 121 Yet with 
the migration of new middle-class residents, in combination with overarching neoliberal city 
policies and the nightlife’s own self-destructive tendencies, the thriving subcultural milieus of 
creatives once attributed to Clubland have all but disappeared.  
 
Conclusion 
Throughout New York City history, location and culture have always had strong ties to 
one another. With its outlandish characters and colorful costumes, Downtown Manhattan and 
1980s nightlife subculture are no exception. However, the self-destructiveness of the Clubland 
lifestyle not only echoes through the demise of nightlife subculture as a whole, but also can be 
observed in the physical transformation of the city. The rise of creative bohemia through the 
rubble of Lower Manhattan contributed to a fast-paced legacy of fashion, music, and film. As the 
decade progressed, nightlife began to suffer the consequences of its wild and aestheticized 
lifestyle. Its demise happened quickly, assisted by the ravages of New York’s AIDS epidemic, 
community unrest, newspaper scandals, zoning amendments, and mayoral interventions. 
  The Lower East Side today teems with commercial activity. Trendy sidewalk cafes, 
high-end boutiques, and tastefully decorated restaurants line next to each other as people jostle 
one another on the narrow sidewalks. The building on the corner, The World—former incubator 
of the Club Kid phenomenon, betrays nothing of its untamed past on its luxury condominium 	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façade. Of course, the bustle of this Manhattan neighborhood comes to no surprise to the 
plethora of pedestrians and window shoppers, but little to their knowledge; the ground they walk 
on was originally rubble belonging to the seediest part of New York City. It is the same rubble, 
of ripped up sidewalks and crumbling tenement buildings, which the political creatives occupied 
less than forty years ago. Unrecognizable in its upscale state, its previous residents would no 
doubt revolt in the irony of its drastic transformation. Yet it is worth considering that these 
artists, musicians, and Club Kids are the ones responsible for the commercial and residential 
urban revitalization enjoyed today. The creative culture that preceded this neighborhood’s 
changes planted the very notion of a “gritty” and a bohemian way of life, the biggest draw to 
those who want to experience the Lower East Side, whether they intended to or not. 
“Authenticity”, or “avant-garde”, or “experimental” are expressions that have been repurposed 
from a largely artistic-activist movement into a commoditized lifestyle, abetted by the rise of 
cultural consumption. The Lower East Side is no longer an area of squatters, working class, or 
homeless citizens, but of upper-middle class residents that owe the livability of their 
neighborhood to pro-gentrification city policies catered to bourgeois ideals.  
Hardly any traces of the vibrant past remain. Iconic venues such as Limelight, the 
Tunnel, Area, and Palladium have all evolved for a tamer New York, converted into upscale 
storefronts, dormitories, and luxury apartments. 122 Yet there exists a difficulty in mourning the 
liminality of Manhattan downtown. While the death of 1980s youth counter culture synonymous 
with venue closures contributed to Manhattan’s demise as the premier party capital and heart of 
an eclectic bohemia, it is also credited to the city’s climb out of decrepitude and to plunging 
crime rates.  New York may not be what it once was, but its drastic metamorphosis has arguably 	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kept the city alive. Thirty years ago, downtown was a place where crime proliferated and even 
New York locals feared. If the city itself were to survive, one could argue it needed to make 
itself attractive and more livable to potential investors. Unfortunately, this meant a departure 
from the core ideology that drove the 1980s subculture. Commerciality and fame that came to 
nightlife and its neighborhoods ultimately ended the unconventional characteristics that made it 
so unique. Is Downtown dead? Changing New York’s reputation from a delinquent metropolis to 
a global city and the parallel metamorphosis of sanitized nightlife signifies a combustible culture 
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